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Abstract
Feminism in Australia is a political movement and a published discourse. Its activities range from Equal
Employment Opportunity practices in the public service to 'cultural' production in such forms as academic
literature and documentary film-making. For most immigrant women of non-English speaking background,
the cultural arena of feminism is foreign, in many more ways than one. Feminism represents, to speak perhaps
too stereo typically, a middle class 'Anglo' culture, far removed from everyday experience. And this despite
well-meaning concern on the part of many feminists for those groups suffering compound oppressions of class
and ethnicity, as well as gender. Symbolically, an almost cult concern is shown for the plight of the migrant
woman outworker, and with considerable real justification. Yet this concern is from a singular cultural
perspective: middle class libertarian liberalism, quite alien to the immediate needs and aspirations of its
subjects.
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Ethnicity Meets Gender Meets Class in Australia
Feminism in Australia is a political movement and a published 
discourse. Its activities range from Equal Employment Opportunity 
practices in the public service to 'cultural' production in such forms 
as academic literature and documentary film-making. For most 
immigrant women of non-English speaking background, the 
cultural arena of feminism is foreign, in many more ways than one. 
Feminism represents, to speak perhaps too stereo typically, a middle 
class 'Anglo' culture, far removed from everyday experience. And 
this despite well-meaning concern on the part of many feminists for 
those groups suffering compound oppressions of class and ethnicity, 
as well as gender. Symbolically, an almost cult concern is shown for 
the plight of the migrant woman outworker, and with considerable 
real justification. Yet this concern is from a singular cultural 
perspective: middle class libertarian liberalism, quite alien to the 
immediate needs and aspirations of its subjects.
Indeed, many non-English speaking background migrant women 
have gone through revolutionary transitions much greater, and 
frequently  dem anding much more personal courage and 
determination, than the careers and life-projects of the leaders of the 
EEO industry or the feminist film makers on their government 
grants. Whilst not speaking feminism, the language of criticism and 
re-assertion of power, the practical struggles of many immigrant 
women are akin in critical spirit and outcome to feminism itself. 
Rather contradictorily, perhaps, this often involves a dramatic self­
transformation, assuming some elements of the radically new 
culture of industrialism, whilst retaining what is powerful and 
positively human in traditional women’s culture. And, as often as 
not it also involves failure, isolation and oppression, as racism meets 
sexism and class immobility with a peculiar vengeance.
In recent years, the cultural gap between the feminist movement and 
non-English speaking background immigrant women in Australia 
has closed somewhat but their encounters are still problematic. To 
.cite one instance, Franca Arena, a Labor member of the New South 
Wales Legislative Council (or Upper House) and Australia's first 
woman parliam entarian of non-English speaking imm igrant 
background, has set up an 'Ethnic Women's Network' which meets 
regularly in Sydney's Parliament House and which has developed
significant political clout. Franca's stated goal for the network is to 
provide an arena for women of non-English speaking background to 
meet with the members - and the procedures - of government on its 
own turf in order to demystify that institution. It has proved to be a 
very successful exercise in constructing a constituency, in giving 
women of non-English speaking background direct access to 
government Ministers and heads of Governmental authorities, and 
in giving them entry into the magical mystery tour of the state. Yet 
the exercise is fraught with contradictions and tensions, primarily 
because, for many of these women, participating in such an 
experience is more significant for their being brought into the 
mainstream than as an expression of their 'ethnic' difference. The 
'privileged' nature of this encounter is reinforced at every meeting 
when the grey suited men, guarding Parliament from the likes of 
ordinary people, especially 'accented' women, delay the participants 
unnecessarily with the etiquette of protecting the institution.
The positions held by the women in these gatherings and the shifts 
they are undergoing in their lives, are neither clear-cut nor parallel. 
They are emblematic however, of the as yet unspoken divide 
between non-English speaking background immigrant women and 
m ainstream  'Anglo' feminists. For example, one of the first 
meetings of the group was addressed by a key feminist activist now 
working within state structures in the service of her sisters. At great 
length, and in passionate terms, she described how important it was 
for her to defy patriarchal bonds, to break out of the straight jacket 
of Catholicism into which she had been socialised through an 
education at the hands of nuns, to leave behind traditional Irish 
values of family and womanhood and to choose to be a single 
independent person. And this to an audience of non-English 
speaking women which included Muslim women in Purdah who had 
come along to this meeting to ask for support to change their work 
practices in order to allow them their traditional prayer sessions; 
and mothers who wanted their children to be taught their mother 
tongue and cultural traditions within the state school system.
On the other hand, there have been sessions where middle-class 
women activists from South American background have bemoaned 
that Australian women's organizations are politically backward and 
that Australian political life is generally suffocated by macho 
'Anglo' ockerism, epitiomised by the array of government ministers 
invited to address the meetings. The 'Anglo' femocrats who turn up, 
accompanying these men, sit quietly at the back and groan at the 
sight - with these men who will never learn and with these women 
who are 'unreal'. They know they have no voice to speak - to preach 
to the non-English speaking background women in such a setting,
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but they are secure in their power back in the offices, as minders of 
ministers and minions of the state.
This chapter attem pts to address those most difficult social 
questions, those that arise when class, gender and ethnicity meet. Of 
course, class, gender and ethnicity are always meeting, but they only 
appear as a 'problem' for groups where the process of intersection 
portends inequality and marginalisation. This is precisely what 
makes this topic so difficult. It is really about huge historical and 
social questions which mainstream social analysis conveniently 
ignores. For example, the points at which middle class culture meets 
male culture meets 'Anglo' culture, social science implicitly 
considers norm al or natural or an irre levant backdrop. 
Furthermore, if we are really concerned with social relations and 
not cultural pathology, any discussion of immigrant women throws 
into question the enormous complexity of the relationships of a 
whole finely stratified or segmented society. The woman question is 
sim ultaneously the man question. The 'ethnicity' question is 
simultaneously the dominant culture question. And the question of 
each fine permutation of class simultaneously implicates the unholy 
synergy of class relations.
So we have, on the one hand, a feminism which is culturally distant 
from those of its subjects whose lives are peculiarly difficult, and on 
the other, a series of fundamental social questions which are 
enormous in their scope and complexity. It is hardly surprising, 
then, that the literature in this area is fragmentary and as yet poorly 
developed. The following is one early contribution, a high speed 
chase through some of the issues. The first section discusses the 
social background; post-war migration to Australia and the place of 
women immigrants in Australian society. The second discusses the 
concepts of ethnicity, class and gender, then the process of 
decentring or fragmentation of everyday life and identity which 
accompanies the migration process with a peculiar intensity. Finally, 
taking up the question of political ways forward, the role of the state 
is analysed, both in the context of women's rights issues and the 
development of multiculturalism, which are certainly not always 
complementary and simply progressive moves.
Women and Post-War Immigration
Australia's post-war immigration, in world-historical terms, has 
been quite extraordinary. Only Israel has experienced more 
immigration over the same period relative to the size of the existing 
population, but in quite an unusual set of historical circumstances. In 
sheer statistical terms, the post-war Australian experience even
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exceeds the great tide of immigration to the USA in the early years 
of the twentieth century. More than three million immigrants have 
arrived since the migration program began in earnest in 1947. The 
population has increased from under eight million to over sixteen 
million. One person in three is an immigrant or the child of an 
immigrant. During the post-war boom, Australia had the highest 
rates of population and workforce growth of any OECD country, 
with immigrants filling 61.2% of the additional jobs between 1947 
and 1972.
Labour market position is one starting point for situating immigrant 
women in a sociological context. In 1947 only 12 percent of the 
Australian workforce had been bom overseas, 70 percent of whom 
were of British origin. 22 percent of the workforce were women. 
By 1976, 26 percent of the workforce were born overseas, 
representing an immigrant population only forty percent of whom 
were British-born. 36 percent of the workforce is now women. In 
other words, there has been a significant shift in the labour force, 
with substantial relative increases in the participation of women, 
immigrants and non-English speakers. Perhaps the most dramatic 
change is the increased number of married women in the workforce, 
from 15 percent of the female workforce in 1947 to 61 percent in 
1979.1
Over the decades, the composition of this immigrant population has 
becom e increasingly diversified. When the mass imm igration 
program  began, there was a strong em phasis on British 
im m igration. Arthur Calwell, the Labour politician who was 
Australia's first M inister of Immigration, gave the assurance that 
for every foreign migrant there will be ten people from the United 
Kingdom: Or at least, those foreigners who were allowed in were to 
be 'assim ilable types' such as the Dutch. However, the racist 
direction of immigration policy and the project of assimilating those 
who were different was to prove unworkable in the long term. In 
fact, even in the short term, the immigration quota of one percent 
population increase per annum could only be met by bringing in 
refugees from war-torn Central and Eastern Europe. Recruitment 
was soon to extend to Southern Europe, and by time of the European 
economic 'miracle' of the late sixties and early seventies, when 
European sources of immigration were running dry, to Turkey and 
the Middle East. By the 1980s, the net had spread even further afield 
with substantial immigration from South East Asia and Central and 
South America.
By the 1980s, 25.8 percent of Australian women aged 20-64 had 
been bom overseas. Splitting this figure by origins, 11.4 percent of
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Australian women were born in non-English speaking countries 
other than Australia: 2.3 percent in Northwest Europe, 1.5 percent 
in Eastern Europe, 7.7 percent in the Mediterranean region, and 3.0 
percent in Third World countries, particularly South East Asia and
Central and South America.2
How do those various groups, as defined by immigrant, or non­
immigrant background and gender, fare in Australian society? 
Employment is a central marker of social class and social status. 
Several key writers have thus taken the labour market as a base- 
point from which to measure the experience of different groups. 
Collins divides the Australian labour market into four major 
segments. The first consists of Australian-born and Anglophone 
male migrants who earn the highest pay and who are employed in 
the tertiary sector or in skilled jobs in the manufacturing sector. 
They have c learly  defined  ca reer struc tu res and are 
disproportionately represented in power structures, such as the 
trade unions and politics. The second segment, of non-Anglophone 
migrant males, is located mainly in semi-skilled and unskilled jobs in 
manufacturing and construction. This is the 'factory fodder' of 
industry, frequently poorly paid, in exhausting and dirty jobs and 
with very low participation in power structures and little hope of 
career advancement. The third segment is Australian-born or 
Anglophone immigrant women, who are paid less than first or 
second segment men and tend to work in traditional areas of 
women's employment in the tertiary sector. In a fourth segment, 
w om en im m igrants from  non-A nglophone countries are 
concentrated in the parts of the manufacturing sector hardest hit by 
economic restructuring. Their pay is lowest and working conditions 
poorest, frequently being involved in piecework or outwork.3 To 
this categorisation De Lepervanche adds fifth and sixth segments of 
Aboriginal men and women respectively, many of whom are 
marginalised to permanently unemployed, fringe dweller status.^
These generalisations are only the beginning of an analysis of the 
place of immigrant women. Indeed, whilst containing a basic 
elem ent of truth, they are crude over-sim plifications. W ithin 
Collin 's third segment, there is considerable differentiation 
according to background. Mediterranean women hold jobs of much 
lower status and which pay more poorly than Northwest Europeans, 
East Europeans and South East Asian W o m e n . 5  This is very much 
linked to class background in the country of origin and level of 
education. Mediterranean women work in the worst jobs in the 
industrial workforce, and are those most vulnerable in the current 
economic restructuring. They suffer severe occupational health and 
safety problems such as repetitive strain injuries, low levels of
6
English language proficiency, and lack of support from male and 
'Anglo'-dominated unions.6
Even this subdivision of a labour market segment is confounded by 
com plexity, however, as each cultural subgroup of immigrant 
women is by no means homogeneous in class terms. Reworking 
1981 census statistics, Evans concludes that between 9 and 14 
percent of employed Australian women of all backgrounds own 
their own businesses w ith w om en of Third  W orld and 
M editerranean origin being more likely to be entrepreneurs than 
other groups.7 This reflects significant class differentiation within 
even a seriously disadvantaged subgroup such as M editerranean 
women, and some genuine and impressive stories of upward social 
mobility. It also reflects official statistics in which outworkers are 
categorised as self-em ployed. Self-em ploym ent, furtherm ore, 
includes fam ily-run shops and milk bars in w hich working 
conditions and rates of return are sometimes as bad as the worst of 
industrial jobs. And, as Collins points out, the proportion self- 
employed in immigrant groups has dropped dramatically in the 
structural economic re-adjustments of the post-war decades, as 
supermarkets, for example, eclipse the corner store.8 There is 
evidence, however, of growth in some forms of 'self-employment' 
such as outwork in the clothing industry. This leaves us with 
complex and contradictory subdifferentiation which does not deny 
the general thrust of overall descriptions of labour m arket 
segmentation, but which serves as a warning against simplistic 
arguments about any necessary outcomes in the overlay of gender, 
class and ethnicity.
The matter is complicated still further by generational differences. 
Contrary to conventional wisdoms about the relation of labour 
migration to the self-perpetuating phenomenon of social class, there 
is evidence of significant intergenerational mobility. The above 
discussion was about first generation workers. What happens to 
second generation children?
Neo-conservative critics of multiculturalism have recently began to 
argue that specialist education and welfare servicing is unnecessary 
because people of non-English speaking background are doing well. 
The first generation, it is admitted, pays a price and is relatively 
immobile, but this is supposedly compensated by significant second 
generation upward mobility, primarily the result o f education. 
Williams argues that a strong family and cultural 'preference' for 
education produces high levels of participation in education on the 
part of non-English speaking background children.9 Birrell speaks 
of family support and ethnic valuing of education which produces
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upward mobility. 'They have been competing with Australians who 
have generally lacked the same intensity of parented support or 
protection from distracting influences, notably peer youth 
culture.'10 In the same vein, Bullivant writes of the 'migrant drive' 
and the 'ethnic work ethic'. The 'Anglo' working class are by 
comparison, 'the new self-deprived'. 11 And indeed, those groups 
which in a first generation fare so badly on the labour market, seem 
to be catching up through the education system in the second. 
Southern European background students, for example, achieve 
greater representation in higher education than the Australian norm.
But this inter-generational differentiation must itself be finely 
differentiated. Relative educational advantage or disadvantage is 
distributed unevenly between ethnic groups, with some more 
recently arrived groups faring particularly badly. Generalisation 
about the educational performance of ethnic groups also ignores the 
fact that they are themselves deeply divided socio-economically and 
by school performance: even if one small stratum appears to be 
succeeding the majority is not. Moreover, by comparison with 
aspirations that accompany the personal or family ambition and 
'self-selection' in the migration process, the results are poor. And 
these mobility problems are in all probability temporary as the post­
war boom becomes a distant memory and the welfare state is rolled 
back. 12
Situating non-English speaking background girls into this already 
contradictory and multifaceted situation, there is considerable 
evidence that their odds of success through education are longer than 
their male counterparts. Whilst retention-rates are higher in the 
secondary school than those of their English speaking background 
peers, their aspirations and performance are lower than both their 
male non-English speaking background counterparts and their 
female peers in general. In some cases, schooling for a girl is valued 
highly but only because it enhances her prestige and manageability, 
rather than because it lays a foundation for career choices and 
alternative futures. Girls are also placed in a particularly difficult 
context of culture clash in which wildly contradictory pressures all 
collide: their parents' high educational expectations; their exposure 
to the liberal culture of romance, self-determination and official 
non-sexist norms; the traditional role-model of a 'good' mother and 
wife; and mainstream sexism and racism which make the traditional 
role seem a comfortable and familiar retreat. 13
W hen E thnicity  M eets G ender and  Class
Class, gender and ethnicity overlay each other in social reality in an
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extraordinarily complex profusion of ways. Having described some 
of these in the Australian context, we will now take one step back to 
discuss the key terms of theory and analysis. In recent decades, the 
litany of concepts class-gender-ethnicity has emerged as a way of 
accounting for lines of social inequality. It is ju st no longer 
fashionable to say that class is, in the last analysis, all. Nor does it 
seem that society can be reduced, in essence, to two fundamental 
classes. Yet, despite the fashionable, comfortable and unquestionable 
good sense behind the litany, it is too glib. It is just a reassurance of 
good faith, in deference to new types of politics. The real and 
nagging demands for recognition of these new politics have 
translated themselves into a new and often poorly thought-through 
conventional wisdom: that class, gender and ethnicity (or race) are 
the key lines of social inequality, the big three, and each oppression 
compounds the other, formula-like. I want to argue, instead, that the 
three categories do not sit together as descriptions of social realities 
which are comparable or even of the same order.
'Culture' or 'ethnicity' is perhaps the most difficult and problematic 
of the three, partly because it is such a vague term. 'Culture', for 
example, varies in meaning from cultural anthroplogy's holism (a 
whole way of life, including material artefacts, kinship structures 
and the social arrangements of subsistence) to the much narrower 
connotations of 'high' or 'folk ' culture. 14 The culture of 
'multiculturalism ', loosely synonymous with ethnicity in social 
policy and social analysis in Australia, is firmly within the narrower 
connotation of folk culture. In this respect it is frequently a 
politically and ideologically skewed term and in many important 
respects of limited use. Certainly ethnicity is a powerful social 
reality, and racism, misreading surface appearances as social 
causes, even more powerful. Yet the concept of ethnicity - culture as 
delimited in the multiculturalism of state policy - is still deeply 
problematic.
The salespeople of the multicultural industry often use fruit salad, 
not even with a quiver of self-mockery or a sense of fatuousness, as a 
metaphor for Australian society. Australia is a cultural-linguistic 
fruit salad bowl, with the bowl as the pluralist, open, liberal 
democratic state, and folk cultures with their 'community' languages 
floating freely about like little slices of fruit, happy to be ingredients 
in the great cuisine of modernity, yet maintaining their distinctive 
flavours in tolerant harmony.
The metaphor is not just fatuous, it is ironically symbolic of the fact 
that food is one of the main elements of the construction 'ethnicity'. 
In schools and the media, for example, the iconography of the
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multicultural is exotic food, clothing and dance. Difference is the 
message but only those colourful manifestations of difference that 
we can celebrate and appreciate for their colour. But, however 
much their middle class clients might enjoy eating out at ethnic 
restaurants in the cosmopolitan city, 'ethnic' restaurants frequently 
involve working conditions for family members which are far from 
attractive. Despite the appearance of difference, the structural 
reality of food in industrial society is as a commodity in a money 
economy. Behind the food there is another world.
To stay with food for a moment, a woman of rural Lebanese 
immigrant background walks into a shop and buys Lebanese bread 
just one in the colourful cacophony of breads. The multicultural city 
is in action. But the woman works in a factory for a wage (abstract 
labour and not direct subsistence). She has separate realms of work 
and domesticity, the week and the weekend (rather than the work 
and the familiar being integrated in traditional rural forms of 
farming). She is housed in suburbia for which she has to pay rent or 
a mortgage (and not subsist on land). She has to be a consumer, 
bank, and negotiate the welfare and education systems - all forms of 
culture (in the other broad anthropological sense) essential to social 
reproduction but totally new and alien to her. Even if she were to 
work in a family restaurant, m aintaining some remnants of 
traditional work forms, the transition through migration into the 
world of full-blown commodity exchange is dramatic. There is not 
much multicultural about this. The culture of multiculturalism is not 
even all that relevant.
The fetish for difference not only often leads to a superficial and 
apolitical reading of culture, it is also unreflectively conservative. 
Preserving communities or folk cultures for posterity as museum- 
pieces is not simply positive - as if we have to maintain a sort of 
cultural national estate. In fact one of the great ironies for the 
liberalism  that cham pions ethnic preservation and cultural 
pluralism, is the illiberal, indeed frequently racist and sexist 
identifications which as much as anything else give cultures an air of 
folk primordiality. Communities certainly resist assimilation and 
articulate their grievances through ethnic identifications and this is 
frequently progressive. But minority identifications are a two edged 
sword, particularly for women. 'Be careful who you marry. Good 
girls traditionally behave in particular ways. They don't marry 
loose Australians'. In any event, the battle to preserve ethnicity, 
very much an interest for certain generations of immigrants and 
particularly for male 'community leaders', may well be a losing one. 
Communities and cultures are mixed, contradictory and conflict- 
ridden things. They are certainly not clearly defined and socially
self-isolating. Apart from the question of whether preservation is a 
good thing or not, it may not even always be possible.
Behind the trivialised and conservative view of culture is a dual 
hidden agenda of assimilation/marginalisation. If we talk less about 
survival strategies and more about the colourful manifestations of 
pluralism, we can conveniently neglect some of the elementary 
issues of social welfare. So, for exam ple, a sm attering of 
'community' languages is presented in schools in a poorly funded 
and fragmentary way as a token of our multiculturalism, without 
taking effective pedagogy as measured in social outcomes, very 
seriously. Behind the colourful differences and despite the 
ideological facade of multiculturalism, immigrants are assimilated, 
ruthlessly but inevitably, into the system: wages-housing-welfare- 
law. But it is often a marginalised assimilation with relative lack of 
power and economic autonomy.
The domain of multiculturalism is not only the traditional and the 
exotic. It is also, in commonsense parlance, the domain of non- 
English speaking immigrants, or the 'ethnics' in current pejorative 
usage. Surely Elton John, Kentucky Fried and Eyewitness News are 
not culture for the purposes of multiculturalism. The multicultural- 
pluralist reading of Australian society reconstructs the dominant 
group as 'Anglo-celtic', an extraordinary cultural hybrid. At this 
point, however, relations of dominance are conceived to be matters 
of intercultural misunderstanding rather than structural relations, 
with the dominant culture distinguishing itself through Yorkshire 
pudding and Irish ditties, or perhaps meat pies and beer advertising 
jingles.
None of this discussion is intended to give the impression that 
ethnicity is not important. Ethnicity is one of the great social issues 
of our time. The discussion is only to unravel some aspects of its 
politics and usages. In short, multiculturalism is used to construct a 
happy ideology of pluralism to the neglect of wider structural 
relations. The powerful reality of ethnicity, however, is that in spite 
of the modernist theories and social policies of the melting pot or 
assimilation, there has been a visible and enduring effect of mass 
migration. Differences have survived the move, more or less and 
for better or for worse But industrialism limits the space inhabited 
by these differences, to the weekend more than the week, to leisure 
more than work, to the domestic more than the public arena. 
Theories of social structure tend to ignore this, presum ably 
irrelevant, space. Theories of ethnicity tend to neglect the way in 
which social structure defines and delimits this space. And then there 
is racism, which links structure and culture/ethnicity, reconstructing
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the appearances of difference, both cultural and phenotypical, as a 
root cause of structural inequality.
Western industrial society, as social structure, is constructed around 
wage labour and commodity production. The history of modem 
times has been one of the relentless generalisation of the commodity 
form across the globe and into everyday life. This massive 
in ternationalising  and un iversalising  trend has produced 
imperialism in its first and blindly brutal phases when it conquered 
indigenous peoples and appropriated the resources of the so-called 
'New World'; later colonisation and labour migration from diverse 
sources to consolidate its progress; and the internationalisation of 
labour, capital and commodities. These are not just matters of 
structure, but profoundly matters of culture, which have tended to 
make everyday life experience and expectations fundamentally 
uniform: around the structure and culture of the commodity form.
But concomitant with this structural/cultural universalisation, the 
integration of a growing proportion of the human population into 
the material life, relations of class and desires of capitalism, has been 
the dramatic a juxtaposition of differences. Not only have workers 
of diverse background been thrown together and an immense 
profusion of colourfully and culturally different commodities been 
put on the market in metropolitan industrial societies, but states have 
had to consider servicing the plurality and re-think some of the 
fundamental tenets of assimilating nationalism. 'Multiculturalism' is 
the response on the part of the liberal democratic state to manage 
and service a diverse population. The use of ethnicity as a political 
bargaining tool is also n ew /in  essence, the goal is still structural 
incorporation, but in a more sophisticated form so that difference 
comfortably and respectably inhabits the private and the social 
relations of the commodity are enhanced rather than confounded by 
the necessary logistics of labour immigration.
The liberalism of multiculturalism is a very contradictory thing. It 
is bom, not of traditionalisms which are characteristically illiberal 
in the definition of their boundaries, but of the cosmopolitanism and 
individualism uniquely characteristic of late industrial societies. 
Difference is fine. All that matters is the smooth reproduction of the 
commodity form. Ethnic politics is even more complex: a rallying 
point against racism and the structural marginalisation of minority 
groups; reconstructed by the liberalism of the state as its own 
rhetorical mission; then against both the initial radical impulse and 
the state's liberal management, it becomes a means of conserving 
supposedly primordial cultures, including their racism and sexism.
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The late industrial state and the culture of the commodity are equally 
liberal when it comes to issues of gender. Certainly, the nuclear 
family and the 'family wage' are structures of unequal gender 
differentiation new to capitalism . But in the spread of the 
commodity even these are destroyed. More traditional domestic 
functions are commodified; the family wage is cut; and women 
increasingly enter the workforce. In the high culture of this 
liberalism are the Equal Employment Opportunity apparatchiki and 
the professional 'Anglo'-feminists. Yet when this liberalism meets 
ethnicity and multiculturalism, it finds itself in cultural conflict with 
traditions which pay little respect to individual autonomy, economic 
independence and gender equality. The same culture of liberalism, 
on the other hand, is the basis of competitive individualism, the 
fragmentation of community and alienation in everyday life. The 
liberal state in late industrial society, in order words, might in some 
cases and in a totally contradictory and hypocritical way, be on the 
way to becoming non-sexist as an integral part of the process of 
extending the culture of the commodity.
Behind the double tendency of late industrialism to increasing 
diversity alongside structural homogenisation, is the development of 
a relativist philosophical fram ework around notions of the 
individual and difference. In everyday terms, this philosophy 
translates into the following terms: W e are all unique individuals. 
We are all different. Our differences are our own business and they 
are o f  equal value. You do your thing and I'll do mine. Anything is 
possible in a world o f  differences. You can choose what you want to 
be. You can have your own culture. You, the individual, should 
control your own destiny. You know what is right fo r  you. Explore, 
experiment, discover fo r  yourself what you can be. Negotiate your 
rights. Look after yo u rse lf' This is one of the most powerful 
messages of the contemporary world. We are all formally equal in 
our differences. Radical doubt and the self are all we are left with. 
A sense of decentred existence comes from the rapidity of change, 
the juxtaposition of differences, the maelstrom of modernity.
The 're-evaluation of all received values’, to use Nietsche's words, is 
a fundamental cultural phenomenon of our time. It is a world of 
contradiction, in which there are both structures that bind and 
radically open options. In pre-industrial societies, disintegrating 
remnants of which many of Australia's immigrants left, one was 
bora into fairly well-defined and durable social relations, of work, 
womenhood or manhood. Now all this appears open. How does one 
choose? What is the centre for judgment and decision-making? This 
is the phenomenon of decentring.
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Decentring is doubly difficult for immigrants from traditional rural 
backgrounds. Despite the happy multicultural ideology of diversity, 
tolerance, and cultural maintenance, dramatically new structures of 
everyday life put pressure on traditional ways of seeing the world 
and behaving in it. For men, there is often a loss of self-esteem as 
their families become more independent and they are reduced to 
child-like statues in menial factory work. There is also a loss of 
authority because they are unfamiliar with the new ways of their 
adopted homeland. The psychological effect can be devastating, with 
profound implications for their wives, who often have to cope with 
this as well as their own adjustment, and care for their children at 
the same time.
For women, there is the double burden of paid work and domestic 
work, in conditions that do not fulfil former ideals of motherhood. 
Financial independence is both liberating and perplexing, opening 
options which destroy identifications that seemed natural and 
inevitable in childhood. Yet these same options of freedom involve 
breaking with deep senses of community, and in the case of women, 
family relations of care and responsibility.
For second generation immigrants, the problem is even more 
serious. The parents can retreat into the absolute moral maxims of 
their past. They can explain their pain in relation to some 
'knowable' loss. The past serves as an explanatory centre, from 
which perspective they can lament their children's waywardness. 
For the next generation this retreat is not so easy. With the rhetoric 
of gender-role equality that is preached at school but hardly 
realized in reality, contesting gender roles at home can appear futile 
to girls, given the likely cost of being cut adrift and alienated from 
their families. They become caught in the intersection of a double 
racism - between being stereotyped as ethnic and morally backward 
by the dominant group, and their parents' hostility, to 'Anglo- 
Australian' cultural and moral 'looseness.' Will they become 
victims of assimilation or acquiescent dupes of traditionalism? The 
conservative option is often taken as an attempt to ground their lives 
in a decentred world. This is simultaneously an affirmation of what 
is positive in traditional female roles, including deep senses of care 
and community, and a recognition of what is personally fragmenting 
and alienating in the world of choice and liberal individualism. In 
many ways, too, the dominant culture of liberal modernity, 
including much career feminism, is characteristically male and 
unattractive: an indifference to feelings and care, a competitive 
hardness, on exhausting self-centredness, a blind aggressiveness.
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So, the class-gender-ethnicity equation is not a simple one of 
com pound oppressions with a clear solution in the form of 
liberation. Affirmation of ethnicity is a two-edged sword: a 
resistance to racism  and dom ination yet itse lf potentially  
conservative and racist. The ethic of liberal feminism is also a two- 
edged sword, liberatory yet belonging to the fragm ented, 
individualistic, self-serving culture of industrialism. The structures 
of social class and the world-historical process of the generalisation 
of the commodity, on the other hand, delimit the politics of gender 
and ethnicity and at the same time remain indifferent to their 
outcomes so long as these do not threaten the system of wage labour 
and commodity consumption.
Women, Ethnicity and the State
Two critical and reforming sets of politics have had a significant 
impact on the state in the past few decades: the politics of gender and 
the politics of ethnicity. Yet the two as argued so far in this chapter, 
are by no means always compatible. Indeed, the two have mostly 
been distant and reserved about each other's objectives. The impact 
of the women's movement on the state, however far it still has to go, 
has been significant. Women have achieved equal rights in matters 
of divorce. They have gained equal pay, formally if not in practice. 
There is anti-discrimination and equal employment opportunity 
legislation. There is paid maternity leave. Institutionalised pre­
school childcare is increasingly available. But the cultural 
aspirations to economic and personal independence behind these 
developments are characteristically more those o f middle-class, 
English speaking career women than non-English speaking 
immigrant women. Or, at least, these women are not so strongly in 
a position either within the home or in the broader context of their 
relative social marginalisation, to avail themselves of the benefits of 
these changes.
We need to keep in mind that in the new country the cultural and 
social distance created by the lack of English and familiarity with 
Australian traditions and institutions, and the dislocation from 
homeland culture as a result of migration, can come together to 
produce a situation of cultural segmentation for some groups of 
non-English speaking background women, leaving them outside of 
any dynamic cultural movement around feminist issues. The state 
therefore for many non-English speaking background women is a 
fore-runner of feminist concerns in that it provides them with rights 
and access to support for which their cultural background 
experience does not prepare them. These seem to be there by magic 
and not linked into the consciousness of the men and women of that
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group who have to negotiate receipt of these rights or live in the 
world where others take them for granted. The multicultural 
movement, on the other hand, developed in such a way that the 
fundamental welfare needs of non-English speaking background 
women were neglected and a mostly male and conservative ethnic 
community leadership was systematically incorporated. This needs 
to be explained in historical terms.
The ideology of assimilation lasted in official rhetoric until the late 
1960s, even if the terminology had shifted cosmetically towards 
'integration' through the decade. By the early 1970s, however, 
assimilation was beginning not to work. Many immigrants were 
obviously staying culturally different. Specialist welfare and 
education needs were emerging as the settlement and welfare 
'problem' became statistically bigger. There was a growing feeling 
that a more sophisticated approach would be needed to stem the tide 
of return migration, principally to the 'economic miracle' in 
Europe. Finally, there was the emergence of 'ethnic' organisations 
and, possibly, a 'migrant vote'.
A1 Grassby, Labor Minister for Immigration from 1972 to 1974 is 
frequently credited, and with considerable justification, as being one 
of the founding fathers of this multiculturalism. But there is also 
important discontinuity which this historical conventional wisdom 
ignores. Grassby's concern was not with difference, pluralism and 
cultural diversity. It was for a unified 'family of the nation', rid of 
forms of social injustice such as those suffered by many immigrants. 
In fact, Grassby very rarely used the term 'm ulticultural' as 
M inister for Immigration. The fundamental welfare reformist 
orientation of Labor was to 'disadvantage' and lines of socio­
economic division. Indeed, 'migrants' (a word to lose favour in the 
era of Fraser/Galbally multiculturalism) were to be understood as a 
subset o f the general class of those disadvantaged socio­
economically and discriminated against. Symptomatic of this policy 
stance was the break-up of the Department of Immigration into the 
various 'mainstream' departments of labour, welfare, education, 
and so on. The problems of migrants were considered, at root, to be 
general matters of social welfare and social justice.
Losing the elections of 1972 and 1974, certain members of the 
Liberal Party began to consider that a decisive 'migrant vote' could 
be possibly mobilised. Fraser, M ackellar and M acPhee were 
particularly important in re-orienting Liberal policy. Their efforts 
eventually came to fruition in the conservative government of the 
late 1970s. The landmark in this process was the Galbally report of 
1978 which became the basis of multicultural policy until the mid-
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1980s. Galbally multiculturalism, in sharp contrast to Grassby's 
'family of the nation', was a clear, determined and extremely cost- 
e ffec tive  elem ent in the neo-conservative  pruning  and 
reconstruction of the welfare state. It was based on real cutbacks in 
government funding. In fact, it produced a reduction in overall 
governm ent expenditure as its recom m endation (which was 
accepted) that tax rebates for overseas dependants be abolished, 
m ore than paid for the program s it set in m otion.Galbally 
m ulticulturalism  involved shifting m igrant services from the 
general rhetoric of social welfare to marginal 'ethnic specific’ 
services. This in part involved constructing 'ethnic' communities as 
self-help welfare agencies and giving them minimal financial 
support. It gave power to frequently conservative and male 
dominated 'community' leaderships. 'Ethnic Schools' and 'Grants- 
in-Aid' were typical of this approach.
Thus the shift in the language for reading cultural difference and 
form ulating settlement and welfare policy was from a unified 
'family of the nation' to multiculturalism; from disadvantage to 
difference; from concern with general socio-economic issues in 
which migrants were included (a Laborist view of reform) to the 
paradigm of cultural difference in which cultural dissonance is the 
main problem; from a social theory of class as the primary social 
division to a social theory of multiple social divisions, none of which 
have priority. Ethnic groups in the new multiculturalism were 
im plicitly viewed, not as class-divided, but as homogeneous. 
'Leaders' of ethnic groups could thus be viewed as 'representative', 
and, at the same time, potentially vocal pressure groups could be 
incorporated into the spirit of the state and given some responsibility 
for their own 'community's' welfare provision.
This is not to say that there has not been significant progress: 
English language learning programs for children and adults; 
'ethnic' radio and television; a telephone interpreter service; 
specialist welfare services; a policy-oriented Office of Multicultural 
Affairs in the Prime Minister's Department. This is the history that 
in Australia has produced a dilemma for feminists and progressives 
in general. Surely respect for the other, the underdog, the minority, 
is in itself a progressive thing. Surely m ulticulturalism and its 
apparent call for ethnic maintenance must be progressive. After all, 
it is concerned with self-determination, tolerance and celebration 
instead of denial of difference. So onto the bandwagon the state has 
created they all hop. At the very least their welfare brief is enlarged. 
But then it gets complicated. When you let 'them' speak, they say 
things that make you uncomfortable.
1 6
Two sites in which this is most clear at the moment are the Equal 
Em ploym ent O pportunity and education. The question of 
participation in employment is a vexing one for the state given that 
women are half the voting constituency and even in its own 
institutions they are grossly under-represented at all the different 
levels. It has tried to respond to the demands of the organised 
women's movement through its EEO structure. M ainstream 
western industrialism, as it incorporates ethnic minorities or women 
into its structures, for example, has to accommodate and service a 
level of difference. Movement to a 'merit' principle of employment 
and promotion partly enshrines this accommodation. Commonsense 
working conceptions of merit of the past have not sat purely upon 
the needs of industrialism, but have also included prejudices about 
skin colour or gender. The dominant form of white, male merit is 
buffeted by questions and struggles which prove the irrelevance, 
injustice and unnecessariness of sexist and racist prejudices to the 
essential structures of industrialism. Critically, these struggles gain 
cogency (but also remain limited) because the merit criterion is 
itself culturally specific and structurally enduring. In other words, 
one can be black or a woman and just as meritorious in terms of 
systems needs and social effectiveness. The commonsense alliance of 
white, male and merit comes under fire without fundamental 
criticism of the deeper cultural specificity of merit to industrialism. 
So, the working conception of m erit changes as unnecessary 
prejudices are removed, but merit itself remains the constant, 
fundam ental, structural requirem ent of industrialism : those 
aptitudes and capacities that its sycophantic or critical operatives 
require to be effective. This has involved limited transformation of 
the concept of merit. Merit now should not prejudice differences. It 
is about essential systems-requirements and not visible cultural or 
physical differences which are, in fact, irrelevant to employment. 
Skin colour and gender should not now prejudice one's merit for 
employment.
But in every moment of respect for difference, even in moments of 
celebration of difference and plurality, there is also a moment of 
cultural incorporation. The cultures of peasant agrarian villagers or 
of domestic womanhood, for example, have no merit in terms of 
significant job promotion or intervention into mainstream power 
structures. M erit becomes an ideal, perhaps even a form of 
liberation or a basis for cultural self-transformation, often not in 
any articulate or explicit way, but through developing expectations 
and struggling to learn the logistics of social effectiveness. 
Becoming meritorious is part of a process of cultural incorporation.
Intervention through education is another critical area where
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ethnicity meets the politics of gender. Here we have mandatory state 
policies on multiculturalism and non-sexism. But they do not sit 
easily together for all the reasons outlined above. In education, the 
non-sexist policy to date has concerned itself mostly with addressing 
girls about their options and taking affirmative action to enlarge the 
choices made available to them. But, and this is of particular 
significance to girls of non-English speaking background whose 
families still value traditional gender roles and aspirations, without 
addressing the boys directly and focusing on their behaviour and 
choices, the lives of the girls can simply be made much more 
difficult.
The question of focus is also a problem for multiculturalism. The 
main response has been that if students' backgrounds are brought 
within the discourse of the school, and if each group is immersed in 
the details of each other's difference, then tolerance and 
understanding will emerge. The teachers are trained for this 
exercise via suspect methods, as the following illustrates.
A simulation game about Greek marriage, devised and led by an 
'A nglo'-A ustralian man was held at a training conference on 
multicultural education for teachers and departmental consultants. 
Variations of this approach can be found in the films, background 
papers and teaching materials that have been created to represent 
'the migrants'. The game went like this: It was announced by the 
group leader that Greeks have arranged marriages - that this was 
one feature of their culture and that the participants would play a 
game that would simulate that experience. The players were asked to 
choose their roles, whether to be male or female, young or old, their 
status and so on. They were then supplied with rules with which to 
arrange the dowries and the marriage. The intention of the game 
was to absorb tolerance by an im m ersion in Greekness: to 
understand by feeling what it is like to be Greek.
Everyone played the game with much gusto and hilarity. But for all 
concerned it was a misleading experience. First, the statement that 
Greeks have arranged marriages is de-facto  racist. Arranged 
marriages have nothing to do the 'Greekness' per se. People of 
Maltese, Italian, Vietnamese and even English background (if one 
remembers the marriage machinations of royalty with their feudal 
lags) are, or have been, involved in them. Second, the players were 
allowed to choose their gender, status and age. Maybe there are 
miracles that can be achieved in our contemporary world, but 
choosing to be male or female in a traditional Greek society was 
pretty well impossible. That very element of choice distorted the 
experience and allowed for the fun. Third, arranged marriages
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cannot be understood at the phenomenal level of their detail. In 
traditional peasant societies that were subsistent and based on kin 
working units, bringing any new person into the fold, with whom 
you would now share the means of subsistence, was the whole 
group's concern. A rranged m arriage was thus structurally  
necessary for the reproduction and survival of that system. With it, 
of course, developed all sorts of customs and mores, in particular 
the necessity of virginity and its relationship to the exchange 
contract. Now, in the process of migration out of the structures that 
supported these practices, symbols and mores, to a society that is 
based on independent income earning units and the culture of choice 
and self-satisfaction through romance, it is difficult for the original 
cultural practice to continue. The children can chose because they 
can support them selves. Indeed they have to be form ally 
independent and mobile.
Simulating the cultural practice in an ossified way without locating it 
in historical context leads seemingly to two pedagogical options. 
The first is to try and teach the children their parents' traditional 
values and practices and encourage them to reproduce them as 
valuable cultural forms. Or, in contrast, you can assert that in the 
land of the brave and free, the child can choose to do anything . They 
can chose to be free like every one else in Australia and make their 
own decisions. One approach is ethnic maintenance. The other is 
assimilation. Of course, neither is an unproblematic 'solution'. It is 
not just a question of determ ination or determining. The two 
processes are constantly in relation. But multiculturalism has not 
seen its way out of this dilemma yet. And such is the confusion still 
that one fears the project might be abandoned before anyone has had 
a chance to reflect and modify their approach.
There is another way. It involves, not immersion in difference and 
familiarity with phenomena, but the necessity to know the processes 
involved in one's becoming when their origins are so diverse. It is a 
peculiarly contemporary issue because of the way that pluralism is 
generalised in all our experiences. It is not enough to know the 
phenomena, nor is it enough to have an understanding of some 
driving structural imperative. They are not dislocated in the lives of 
many people. The issues of gender and ethnicity emerged out of 
modernist struggles against patriarchy and imperialisms of all 
kinds. But in some cases it appears that the difference that was 
spawned and defended denies the modernist emancipatory direction 
that gave it birth. So the state, which now imposes the modernist 
social democratic victories, has also had to cater for difference. It 
condones separatist Muslim schools that steer their girls in a very 
traditional direction and Greek cultural associations whose main aim
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is to ensure intermarriage. We are left with a paradox, a paradox 
that cannot be approached by mainstream feminists simply asking 
women of non-English speaking background to join in their game, 
nor by viewing the state only within the logic of the dominant social 
arrangements.
This chapter has attempted to portray the complex relationship of 
feminism to the politics of ethnic self-assertion. Rather than simply 
assum e that coun ter-hegem onic  po litics  are necessarily  
complementary, it has shown some important ways in which they 
profoundly contradict each other's intentions. These contradictions 
manifest themselves in real tensions and divisions, cracks which are 
often papered over by the nice sounding class - gender - ethnicity 
litany. On the one hand, mainstream institutional feminism is rooted 
fundam entally in that liberal, libertarian culture of individual 
freedom unique to late industrial societies. On the other hand, whilst 
the politics of ethnicity involves many fatally regressive and 
quiescent elements, non-English speaking background women also 
frequently live in a uniquely women's culture which is itself 
counter-cultural to the dominant ethos of conventional success in 
late industrial society. Dialogue between the mainstream feminist 
movement and non-English speaking background women would 
fruitfully open much feminism to critical scrutiny for its own 
cultural and historical role and at the same time open the lives of 
many non-English speaking background women to the positive 
things in the culture of liberal industrialism, without losing the 
profound sense of the social they have brought from cultural settings 
not so far down the track of industrialism. The solution to the 
complexity and contradiction is not vive la difference. It is critical 
dialogue and the forging of a new culture, beyond nostalgic 
traditionalisms and beyond the liberal modernity of the culture of 
the commodity.
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